"Marc Randazza tells Wordpress that the unflattering story "is not fair use.
Well-known copyright lawyer Marc Randazza used the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to delete an online article about a dispute between his former employer and himself.
Click Below to Read the FULL document, So many Lies. Marc Randazza is the world's most hypocritical lawyer and violates First Amendment Rights in mass.
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/02/embattled-copyright-lawyer-uses-dmca-to-remove-article-about-himself/
Thursday, November 2, 2017
When I First Spoke to Marc Randazza he said that the Big Media had a Monopoly on Free Speech and there was Not Much I Could Do about it. Guess I Proved First Amendment Attorney Marc Randazza VERY Wrong.
Investigative Blogger Crystal Cox was the FIRST to gain Equal Free Speech Rights for ALL Bloggers to that of Institutional Press Journalists.
It was ruled for the first time that a blogger is entitled to the same free speech protection as a journalist.
On 2014, blogger Crystal Cox accused Obsidian and Kevin D. Padrick of corrupt and fraudulent conduct. Although the court dismissed most of Cox's blog posts as opinion, it found one post to be more factual in its assertions (and, therefore, defamatory).
On 2014, blogger Crystal Cox accused Obsidian and Kevin D. Padrick of corrupt and fraudulent conduct. Although the court dismissed most of Cox's blog posts as opinion, it found one post to be more factual in its assertions (and, therefore, defamatory).
It was ruled for the first time,[17][18] by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,[19] that a blogger is entitled to the same free speech protection as a journalist and cannot be liable for defamation unless the blogger acted negligently.[20] In the decision, journalists and bloggers are equally protected under the First Amendment[17] because the "protections of the First Amendment do not turn on whether the defendant was a trained journalist, formally affiliated with traditional news entities, engaged in conflict-of-interest disclosure, went beyond just assembling others' writings, or tried to get both sides of a story."[19]:11–12[21]
I, Crystal Cox was the FIRST, because I refused Settlements over and over. I wanted a precedent to FREE all Citizen Journalists, Investigative Bloggers and Whistleblowers
#DefamationCase #FreeSpeech #ConstitutionalLaw #CrystalCoxCase #Whistleblower #InvestigativeBlogger #Ant-Slapp #CitizenJournalist #FirstAmendment #Defamation #DefamationLawsuit
When I First Spoke to Marc Randazza he said that the Big Media had a Monopoly on Free Speech and there was Not Much I Could Do about it. Guess I Proved First Amendment Attorney Marc Randazza VERY Wrong.
Sunday, October 29, 2017
In Randazza v. Cox, Nevada Judge Gloria Navarro issued an unconstitutional TRO against Blogger Crystal Cox and Gave Marc Randazza massive online content and intellectual property. Thereby shutting down Cox's speech and flat out stealing blogs, online content and redirecting MY WORK and PROPERTY to Randazza's Legal Blog SLAMMING me and Promoting him and his law firm. In that Case it was OK and seemingly Lawful for a Federal Judge to go ahead and take my Constitutional Rights. Check Out this case below where WORLDS Most Hypocritical Lawyer Marc Randazza Makes the OPPOSITE CASE AGAIN.
"In the motion to dissolve the order, attorney Marc Randazza points out that fashioning a libel lawsuit as a tortious interference lawsuit doesn't change the ultimate goal of the litigation: to silence criticism."
"Judge Decides Free Speech Is Still A Right;
Dumps Prior Restraint Order Against Mattress Review Site
Source of Above and Full Hypocritical Filing
"Before the court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should
"For the foregoing reasons, and for those expressed in the parties’ briefing and oral
Questions or Tips??? eMail me at ReverendCrystalCox@Gmail.com
#MarcRandazza #RandazzaQuotes #RandazzaLegalGroup #FreeSpeech
"Judge Decides Free Speech Is Still A Right;
Dumps Prior Restraint Order Against Mattress Review Site
A couple of weeks ago, a federal judge in Utah decided prior restraint was the best way to handle a recently-filed defamation suit against Honest Mattress Reviews by Purple Innovations, makers of the Purple Mattress.
Purple's lengthy filing contained numerous allegations of harm caused by Honest Mattress Reviews' extended commentary on the white plastic powder covering every mattress Purple ships. It also alleged HMR was just a front for site owner Ryan Monahan's brand management work with Purple's competitor, Ghostbed. Rather than give HMR a chance to respond, the judge decided the review site could publish nothing further about Purple or the lawsuit. It wasn't even allowed to refer to its previous rating of Purple's mattress.
Honest Mattress Review didn't care much for this decision -- one it had been given no chance to contest. It immediately posted an article about the case and offered to comply with the letter of the order, but perhaps not its spirit.
This temporary order commands that we take down all reviews, and even cease rating this company with a rating of “Poor.” Yes, indeed, we are no longer even permitted to rate this company as Poor. I guess we will change its rating to “💩.”[...]Do you trust a company that, rather than compete in the marketplace, decides that it will just try and sue negative reviews out of existence?
Purple Innovations immediately returned to court, demanding it find HMR in contempt of its order, in particular pointing to the poo emoji and HMR's claims about the unconstitutionality of the order and Purple's alleged disingenuousness in filing the libel suit.
That review has since been reinstated and given this header image.
And HMR has published a long list of court documents it has filed in this case. This includes a motion to dissolve the restraining order and a preliminary examination of the powdery substance Purple claims is harmless and that HMR claims could be hazardous to purchasers' health.
The action is a quintessential SLAPP suit designed to suppress negative consumer journalism. Plaintiffs have cleverly attempted to disguise this defamation claim as a Lanham Act claim – presumably to ensure the availability of Federal Court jurisdiction and to try to side-step the clear case law that cuts against them in defamation actions. But, no matter how eloquently someone may call a “dog” a “chicken,” it will never lay eggs. And styling a specious defamation claim as a Lanham Act claim does not remove the underlying speech from the protections afforded by the First Amendment.
He also points out that Purple's claims that the plastic packing dust is harmless haven't been supported by anything Purple's willing to let customers and competitors view. Instead, it's only made vague assertions about its safety. And those statements are ultimately meaningless when examined closely.
Plaintiff sells mattresses that are made of a rubber honeycomb, which they then dust with a powder that they claim is made of plastic and has been shown to be polyethylene microspheres. In other words, someone who sleeps on these mattresses would be expected to inhale these microspheres. The Plaintiff claims that it is “non toxic” and “food grade” plastic – but this does not assuage the concerns. After all, a plastic fork is “food grade” and “non toxic” but you most certainly would not want to actually eat it. The same goes for what a person wants to put in their lungs. It was reasonable to be concerned about this “plastic powder” since (a) if the particles that make up this plastic “powder” are of a certain size, they will pass through the alveoli into the bloodstream; or (b) if they are a bit larger, they will simply lodge themselves inside the lungs.
To support its claims, HMR put a Harvard Professor of Pathology to work. Dr. John Godleski's report[PDF] is far from complete at this point, but what's contained in his preliminary examination of the powder doesn't appear to agree with Purple's assertions of harmlessness.
By Fourier Transformed Infrared spectroscopy (FTIR), the white powder particles were shown to be polyethylene, and the purple frame was found to be polyethylene-polypropylene copolymer. The foam portion of the mattress is still understudy, but has characteristics of butadiene, and may be a form of butadiene polymer.Polyethylene is a common plastic formed into many structures. As inhalable microspheres, these have the potential to cause respiratory irritation especially when inhaled in large numbers as shown in my laboratory (1- 4). In addition, polyethylene has been associated with allergy in the form of either asthma or contact dermatitis in sensitized individuals (5-7). Based on this assessment, it is important for consumers to be aware of the composition of this fine particulate matter in the mattress which may be released into the air and has the potential for the development of respiratory or dermal hypersensitivity in some individuals.
Also included in the filed documents is an affidavit that undercuts Purple's claims about HMR's site owner being a competitor's "brand manager." This is central to Purple's Lanham Act claims -- the claims it's using to sidestep anti-SLAPP motions. The affidavit from the competitor (Ghostbed) notes HMR's site owner has never been directly employed by Ghostbed and that Ghostbed told him to stop referring to himself as its "brand manager" after noticing that statement on his Twitter profile.
The judge presiding over the case appears to have been overwhelmed by the pile of documents landing on his desk. A short order [PDF] issued on the 15th shows what can happen when a normally adversarial process is allowed to be, you know, adversarial.
For the reasons set forth in the parties’ briefing and at oral argument, the court finds a lack of “clear and unequivocal” support for a right to relief that is necessary for the entry of the “extraordinary remedy” of a preliminary injunction. Greater Yellowstone Coal v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir. 2003). As such, the court hereby grants Defendants’ motions to dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. No. 36), and denies Plaintiff’s oral Motion to convert the Temporary Restraining Order into a Preliminary Injunction. The court similarly denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Conduct Expedited Discovery (Dkt. No. 39) and Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should not be Held in Contempt (Dkt. No. 17). The court further denies Defendants’ request for sanctions, finding that such sanctions are not warranted here.
The restraining order is lifted and HMR's turd-laced post isn't in danger of being found contemptuous. The lawsuit should continue in a more constitutional fashion from this point forward.
Source
"Conclusion and Relief Sought
Because Defendants are likely to succeed on a motion to vacate the TRO, before this Court or on appeal, a stay of the TRO is warranted. Defendants’ fundamental First Amendment rights must not be stymied by the speculations of a Plaintiff who wishes to shut down discussion rather than answer legitimate questions, no matter how hyperbolically raised. Plaintiff has no likelihood of success on its underlying claims and was not entitled to the TRO.
Case 2:17-cv-00138-DB Document 28 Filed 03/09/17 Page 23 of 25
- 24 -
The exigency and urgency of dissolving this temporary restraining order can not be
overstated. Even a temporary suppression of First Amendment rights is itself irreparable harm.
However, given that this is information consumers need to make an informed decision about the health risks inherent in use of the Purple Mattress, even a temporary suppression of this information could be the proximate cause of actual illness or injury."
" Plaintiff is clearly aggressively intent on suppressing this information. At this point, the reporting has been shored up by the expert report of Dr. Godleski. The Purple Mattress, as currently manufactured, appears to be a public health hazard. This Court should abide no further censorship. "
Source of Above and Full Hypocritical Filing
Judge Grants Randazza's Order. To bad I did not have this judge when Randazza got a TRO against me in Randazza v. Cox
"Before the court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should
not be Held in Contempt (Dkt. No. 17), Defendants Ryan Monahan and Honest Reviews, LLC’s
Emergency Motion to Stay and Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order (Amended) (Dkt. No. 28), Defendant Ghostbed Inc.’s Motion to Dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. No. 36),
"For the reasons set forth in the parties’ briefing and at oral argument, the court finds a
lack of “clear and unequivocal” support for a right to relief that is necessary for the entry of the “extraordinary remedy” of a preliminary injunction. Greater Yellowstone Coal v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir. 2003). As such, the court hereby grants Defendants’ motions to dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. No. 36), and denies Plaintiff’s oral Motion to convert the Temporary Restraining Order into a Preliminary Injunction. "
"For the foregoing reasons, and for those expressed in the parties’ briefing and oral
arguments, Docket Numbers 17 and 39, as well as Plaintiff’s oral Motion to convert the
Temporary Restraining Order into a Preliminary Injunction, are hereby DENIED. Docket
Number 28 and the portion of Docket Number 36 requesting dissolution of the Temporary
Restraining Order are GRANTED. Defendants’ request for sanctions is DENIED."
Source of Above and Full Judicial Order
Check out Randazza v. Cox Docket and See how to REALLY use prior restraint to suppress speech and flat out steal online content AND top search engine placement.
Lot's More Coming SOON on how to us a TRO effectively to Steal Content, Steal Search Engine Placement, Steal Intellectual Property and More. As inspired by Randazza Legal Group, Marc Randazza, J. DeVoy and Ronald Green.
#MarcRandazza #RandazzaQuotes #RandazzaLegalGroup #FreeSpeech
Wednesday, October 25, 2017
Marc Randazza Bankruptcy Challenges by Liberty Media
Marc Randazza Bankruptcy and Liberty Media
"In the meantime, Randazza's old employer, Liberty Media, is challenging his Nevada court filing seeking Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. In that filing, Randazza claimed assets of up to $10 million, and liabilities of up to $50 million. Randazza included in his liabilities a potential $10 million judgement against him in a lawsuit with a blogger, Crystal Cox of Washington; $1 million to Liberty; as well as another $1 million judgement against him in a lawsuit he's embroiled in with Roca Labs of Largo, Florida."
Source and More
http://1701news.com/node/1183/so-who-klingon-lawyer-marc-randazza.html
IAA could be confirmed by the state court, Debtor, by and through its counsel L&Z, initiated
settlement negotiations with E/L. During these negotiations, Debtor consistently used the threat of
a bankruptcy petition in an attempt to negotiate a sum of payment significantly reduced from that
awarded to E/L in the IAA. Not only did Debtor use the threat of bankruptcy as a cudgel, but he andhis allegedly estranged wife have initiated sealed divorce proceedings, and dissipated assets."
"Debtor attempted delay for two reasons: (1) in a misguided effort to stay the award of attorneys fees by the Arbitrator, as well as the confirmation of the IAA by the state court; and (2) to push the date of petition out more than 90 days, so that Debtor’s fraudulent, improper, and preferential transfers could not be clawed back, including payments to his attorneys L&Z.
According to Debtor’s schedules filed on September 11, 2015, Debtor has deposited with
L&Z sums totaling $94,000. [ECF 15] On September 22, 2015, L&Z filed the instant Application
to Employ and Retain Larson & Zirzow, LLC as Attorneys for the Debtor Nunc Pro Tunc to the
Petition Date."
"According to the retainer agreements and statements made therein, L&Z entered into
representation of Debtor as of June 11, 2015 for “pre-bankruptcy settlement negotiations and to
attend a settlement conference. The Debtor paid L&Z a flat fee of $10,000.00 for this engagement.”
"L&Z also purports to have been retained, via two separate retainer agreements, for representation in both a bankruptcy action, and a potential adversary proceeding."
"the second was for potential nondischargeability litigation. "
"L&Z’s Application is deficient as it relates to exactly what the scope of services are that it
has billed for as of yet. In fact, L&Z only informs as to the fact that it has received a total sum of
$94,000 for legal services in connection with Debtor’s Chapter 11 case. “Of this sum, L&Z billed
and was paid the sum of $26,908.82 prior to the Petition Date, and L&Z currently holds in trust the
remainder sum of $67,091.18 (the “Remaining Retainer”) a portion of which has been allocated
pursuant to the Representation Agreements for potential adversary proceedings.” [ECF 18 at ¶16 (emphasis added)] This Application utterly fails to identify and delineate what services were
provided totaling $26,908.82."
"In any event, all transfers were made within 90 days of the filing of Debtor’s Petition. As
such, the “pre-bankruptcy” retainer fees charged and collected by L&Z constitute an avoidable
preferential transfer, and the funds must be clawed back to the estate. As a result, L&Z will lose
their status as “disinterested parties” and are therefore not qualified to serve as attorneys for the
Debtor.
II. L&Z’S APPLICATION IS INSUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE TEST FOR
APPROVAL OF HIRING OF PROFESSIONALS.
L&Z’s employment as attorneys for the debtor in possession in a Chapter 11 case is
governed by § 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires court approval for the attorney's
employment. The bankruptcy court is charged with “ensur[ing] that attorneys who represent the
debtor do so in the best interests of the bankruptcy estate.” In re Park–Helena Corp., 63 F.3d 877,
880 (9th Cir.1995). Under § 327, an attorney for a debtor cannot “hold or represent an interest
adverse to the estate”; he or she must be a “disinterested person.” 11 U.S.C. § 327(a).
Any creditor of the estate, or anyone with “an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate ... by reason of any direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor,” is not a disinterested person. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14)(A), (C). A “creditor” includes any “entity that has a
claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the
debtor.” § 101(10)(A). A “claim” includes any “right to payment.” § 101(5)(A).
To enable the Bankruptcy Court to evaluate an attorney's potential employment, Rule
2014(a) requires that an application for employment of an attorney under § 327 “shall be
accompanied by a verified statement of the person to be employed setting forth the person's
connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and
accountants, the United States trustee, or any person employed in the office of the United States
trustee.” Fed. R. Bankr.P. 2014(a). This disclosure requirement is applied “strictly.” Park–Helena,
63 F.3d at 881.
An attorney approved for employment under § 327 must apply for interim or final
compensation, which is subject to approval of the Bankruptcy Court. 11 U.S.C. §§ 328–31; see also
In re Chapel Gate Apartments, Ltd., 64 B.R. 569, 575 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1986) (noting that “fees in
bankruptcy cases ... are subject to review, modification, and outright cancellation by the Court”).
Rule 2016(a) requires an attorney seeking compensation and/or reimbursement of expenses to file
an application “setting forth a detailed statement of (1) the services rendered, time expended and
expenses incurred, and (2) the amounts requested.”
The fee application must also include, inter alia, “a statement as to what payments have theretofore been made or promised to the applicant for services rendered or to be rendered in any capacity whatsoever in connection with the case, [and] the source of the compensation so paid or promised.” Id. After notice and a hearing, the court may award “reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered,” as well as “reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.” §330(a)(1)."
Source and Full Filing
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.38.0.pdf
Liberty Media Move for Order to Modify Stay
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.60.0.pdf
Doc. 60-2 to above Motion
http://ia600807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.60.2.pdf
Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award Exhibit - 60-6
http://ia600807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.60.6.pdf
Liberty Media Reply
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.80.0.pdf
COMPLAINT by Liberty Media and Others to Determine Non-Dischargeable Debt
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.83.0.pdf
Doc. 120 filed by Liberty Media, First Amended Complaint, Demand for Jury Trial
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.120.0.pdf
Marc Randazza Bankruptcy Case Docket
http://ia600807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.docket.html
Doc. 148 Settlement
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.148.0.pdf
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.157.0.pdf
EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER DIRECTING EXAMINATION
PURSUANT TO FED.R.BANKR.P.2004 OF MARC J. RANDAZZA
"Creditors Excelsior Media Corp. (“Excelsior”) and Liberty Media Holdings, LLC
(“Liberty” and together with Excelsior, “Creditors”), by and through their counsel, James D.
Greene, Esq. of Greene Infuso, LLP pursuant to section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code and Rule
2004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and Rule 2004 of the Local Rules of
Bankruptcy Practice and Procedure, hereby apply to the Court for entry of order directing Debtor
Marc J. Randazza (“Debtor”) to appear for and submit to examination under oath before certified court reporter at the office of Greene Infuso, LLP, 3030 South Jones Blvd. Suite 101, Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 on a date and time to be determined, providing that notice of said examination is to be provided no less than 10 judicial days before such examination date. In support of this
application (“Application”), Creditors state as follows:
Above Order Granted
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.188.0.pdf
Doc. 191 Liberty Media SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR ORDER CONFIRMING INTERIMARBITRATION AWARD
http://ia600807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.191.0.pdf
CAN YOU SAY PATTERN AND HISTORY ???
"In the meantime, Randazza's old employer, Liberty Media, is challenging his Nevada court filing seeking Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. In that filing, Randazza claimed assets of up to $10 million, and liabilities of up to $50 million. Randazza included in his liabilities a potential $10 million judgement against him in a lawsuit with a blogger, Crystal Cox of Washington; $1 million to Liberty; as well as another $1 million judgement against him in a lawsuit he's embroiled in with Roca Labs of Largo, Florida."
Source and More
http://1701news.com/node/1183/so-who-klingon-lawyer-marc-randazza.html
Liberty Media Opposition Motion (Doc. 38)
"In an effort to avoid payment of the entire monetary component of the IAA, and before theIAA could be confirmed by the state court, Debtor, by and through its counsel L&Z, initiated
settlement negotiations with E/L. During these negotiations, Debtor consistently used the threat of
a bankruptcy petition in an attempt to negotiate a sum of payment significantly reduced from that
awarded to E/L in the IAA. Not only did Debtor use the threat of bankruptcy as a cudgel, but he andhis allegedly estranged wife have initiated sealed divorce proceedings, and dissipated assets."
"Debtor attempted delay for two reasons: (1) in a misguided effort to stay the award of attorneys fees by the Arbitrator, as well as the confirmation of the IAA by the state court; and (2) to push the date of petition out more than 90 days, so that Debtor’s fraudulent, improper, and preferential transfers could not be clawed back, including payments to his attorneys L&Z.
According to Debtor’s schedules filed on September 11, 2015, Debtor has deposited with
L&Z sums totaling $94,000. [ECF 15] On September 22, 2015, L&Z filed the instant Application
to Employ and Retain Larson & Zirzow, LLC as Attorneys for the Debtor Nunc Pro Tunc to the
Petition Date."
"According to the retainer agreements and statements made therein, L&Z entered into
representation of Debtor as of June 11, 2015 for “pre-bankruptcy settlement negotiations and to
attend a settlement conference. The Debtor paid L&Z a flat fee of $10,000.00 for this engagement.”
"L&Z also purports to have been retained, via two separate retainer agreements, for representation in both a bankruptcy action, and a potential adversary proceeding."
"the second was for potential nondischargeability litigation. "
"L&Z’s Application is deficient as it relates to exactly what the scope of services are that it
has billed for as of yet. In fact, L&Z only informs as to the fact that it has received a total sum of
$94,000 for legal services in connection with Debtor’s Chapter 11 case. “Of this sum, L&Z billed
and was paid the sum of $26,908.82 prior to the Petition Date, and L&Z currently holds in trust the
remainder sum of $67,091.18 (the “Remaining Retainer”) a portion of which has been allocated
pursuant to the Representation Agreements for potential adversary proceedings.” [ECF 18 at ¶16 (emphasis added)] This Application utterly fails to identify and delineate what services were
provided totaling $26,908.82."
"In any event, all transfers were made within 90 days of the filing of Debtor’s Petition. As
such, the “pre-bankruptcy” retainer fees charged and collected by L&Z constitute an avoidable
preferential transfer, and the funds must be clawed back to the estate. As a result, L&Z will lose
their status as “disinterested parties” and are therefore not qualified to serve as attorneys for the
Debtor.
II. L&Z’S APPLICATION IS INSUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE TEST FOR
APPROVAL OF HIRING OF PROFESSIONALS.
L&Z’s employment as attorneys for the debtor in possession in a Chapter 11 case is
governed by § 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires court approval for the attorney's
employment. The bankruptcy court is charged with “ensur[ing] that attorneys who represent the
debtor do so in the best interests of the bankruptcy estate.” In re Park–Helena Corp., 63 F.3d 877,
880 (9th Cir.1995). Under § 327, an attorney for a debtor cannot “hold or represent an interest
adverse to the estate”; he or she must be a “disinterested person.” 11 U.S.C. § 327(a).
Any creditor of the estate, or anyone with “an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate ... by reason of any direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor,” is not a disinterested person. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14)(A), (C). A “creditor” includes any “entity that has a
claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the
debtor.” § 101(10)(A). A “claim” includes any “right to payment.” § 101(5)(A).
To enable the Bankruptcy Court to evaluate an attorney's potential employment, Rule
2014(a) requires that an application for employment of an attorney under § 327 “shall be
accompanied by a verified statement of the person to be employed setting forth the person's
connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and
accountants, the United States trustee, or any person employed in the office of the United States
trustee.” Fed. R. Bankr.P. 2014(a). This disclosure requirement is applied “strictly.” Park–Helena,
63 F.3d at 881.
An attorney approved for employment under § 327 must apply for interim or final
compensation, which is subject to approval of the Bankruptcy Court. 11 U.S.C. §§ 328–31; see also
In re Chapel Gate Apartments, Ltd., 64 B.R. 569, 575 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1986) (noting that “fees in
bankruptcy cases ... are subject to review, modification, and outright cancellation by the Court”).
Rule 2016(a) requires an attorney seeking compensation and/or reimbursement of expenses to file
an application “setting forth a detailed statement of (1) the services rendered, time expended and
expenses incurred, and (2) the amounts requested.”
The fee application must also include, inter alia, “a statement as to what payments have theretofore been made or promised to the applicant for services rendered or to be rendered in any capacity whatsoever in connection with the case, [and] the source of the compensation so paid or promised.” Id. After notice and a hearing, the court may award “reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered,” as well as “reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.” §330(a)(1)."
Source and Full Filing
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.38.0.pdf
Liberty Media Move for Order to Modify Stay
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.60.0.pdf
Doc. 60-2 to above Motion
http://ia600807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.60.2.pdf
Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award Exhibit - 60-6
http://ia600807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.60.6.pdf
Liberty Media Reply
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.80.0.pdf
COMPLAINT by Liberty Media and Others to Determine Non-Dischargeable Debt
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.83.0.pdf
Doc. 120 filed by Liberty Media, First Amended Complaint, Demand for Jury Trial
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.120.0.pdf
Marc Randazza Bankruptcy Case Docket
http://ia600807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.docket.html
Doc. 148 Settlement
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.148.0.pdf
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.157.0.pdf
EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER DIRECTING EXAMINATION
PURSUANT TO FED.R.BANKR.P.2004 OF MARC J. RANDAZZA
Doc. 187
(“Liberty” and together with Excelsior, “Creditors”), by and through their counsel, James D.
Greene, Esq. of Greene Infuso, LLP pursuant to section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code and Rule
2004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and Rule 2004 of the Local Rules of
Bankruptcy Practice and Procedure, hereby apply to the Court for entry of order directing Debtor
Marc J. Randazza (“Debtor”) to appear for and submit to examination under oath before certified court reporter at the office of Greene Infuso, LLP, 3030 South Jones Blvd. Suite 101, Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 on a date and time to be determined, providing that notice of said examination is to be provided no less than 10 judicial days before such examination date. In support of this
application (“Application”), Creditors state as follows:
LEGAL ARGUMENT
An examination pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004 can be ordered [o]n motion of any
party in interest.” In re Stasz, 387 B.R. 271, 273 n.3 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008); see also In re Lifeco
Inv. Grp., Inc., 173 B.R. 478, 480 (Bankr. D. Del 1994), quoting Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(a).
Bankruptcy Rule 2004 further provides that the Court may order the examination and the
production of documentary evidence concerning any matter that relates “to the liabilities and
financial condition of the debtor, or to any matter which may affect the administration of the
debtor’s estate, or… any other matter relevant to the case or tot the formulation of a plan.” Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 2004(b); see also In re Dinubilo, 177 B.R. 932, 936 n.6 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (noting that
“[u]nder Rule 2004, a court may order the examination of any person on motion of any party in
interest.”).
Generally, examinations under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 are for the “purpose of
discovering assets and unearthing frauds.” In re Rafsky, 300 B.R. 152, 153 n.2 (Bankr. D. Conn.
2003) (citation omitted); In re N. Plaza LLC, 395 B.R. 113, 122 n.9 (S.D. Cal. 2008).
The scope of a Bankruptcy Rule 2004 examination is “unfettered and broad,” as the plain
language of the rule indicates. See 9 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 2004.02[1] at 2004-6 (15th ed. Rev.
1997); In re Dinublilo, 177 B. R. at 939 quoting In re GHR Energy Corp., 33 B.R. 451, 453
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1983).
The broad latitude of Bankruptcy Rule 2004 examination furthers the purpose of the rule, which is “to allow the court to gain a clear picture of the condition and the whereabouts of the bankrupt’s estate. In re Int’l Fibercom, Inc., 283 B.R. 290, 292 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2002) (permitted Bankruptcy Rule 2004 examination aimed at “obtaining information that will … potentially uncover additional claims that may exist for the benefit of the estate”); see also In re W & S Investments, Inc., 985 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Bankruptcy Rule 2004 is a broadly construed discovery device…”); In re French, 145 B. R 991, 992 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1992) (“Bankruptcy Rule 2004… does not offer the procedural safeguards available under Rule 26 of the Federal Rule Rules of Civil Procedure.”)."
"The information and documents which Creditors seek through this Application relate to
matters that are clearly with the permitted scope of Rule 2004, including: (i) property of the
Debtor’s bankruptcy estate; (ii) transactions and business dealings involving the Debtor and
family members and corporate entities; (iii) potential claims the Creditor may have against third
parties; and (iv) other matters affecting the administration of the Debtor’s estate."
Source and Full Document
Above Order Granted
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.188.0.pdf
Doc. 191 Liberty Media SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR ORDER CONFIRMING INTERIMARBITRATION AWARD
http://ia600807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.191.0.pdf
CAN YOU SAY PATTERN AND HISTORY ???
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